Research Agenda 

My research investigates a central question in comparative political economy: What are the consequences of democratic innovations in authoritarian regimes, and how do these institutions shape the governance of resources and legitimacy? Authoritarian governments around the world increasingly adopt participatory mechanisms such as participatory budgeting, consultative councils, or public accountability platforms. These institutions appear to empower citizens by giving them opportunities to propose and vote on projects, but they may also function as instruments of authoritarian resilience by channeling citizen demands, managing expectations, and projecting responsiveness without altering underlying power relations. 

The empirical core of my work is Uzbekistan’s participatory budgeting (PB) program, launched in 2021 through a nationwide online portal known as the “Open Budget.” The initiative allows citizens to propose and vote on local infrastructure and social development projects—from road paving and drinking water systems to school repairs and health clinics. Since its inception, the platform has received tens of thousands of proposals and millions of votes. On the surface, it represents a textbook case of democratic innovation. Yet Uzbekistan remains a centralized authoritarian state with limited political competition, weak civil society, and constrained public discourse. My work examines whether such reforms meaningfully alter citizen judgments of state legitimacy or whether they normalize minimal engagement while leaving deeper governance challenges unaddressed. 

Theoretical Contributions 

My research advances theory by linking debates on authoritarian responsiveness, participatory governance, and political economy. I develop a framework that identifies three mechanisms through which PB may shape judgments of legitimacy: 

This framework specifies when and why citizen engagement in authoritarian settings can influence perceptions of state legitimacy, while clarifying the conditions under which these effects diminish over time. It situates my work within broader comparative political economy debates about institutional design under nondemocracy, resource distribution, and the trade-offs regimes face in balancing legitimacy with control. By showing how authoritarian regimes adopt reforms that resemble democratic practices, my research demonstrates how such institutions can generate short-term legitimacy but often reinforce resilience rather than catalyze deeper political transformation.
 
Empirical Research

I employ a multi-method research design that combines experimental, qualitative, and observational evidence. In an online survey experiment with nearly 2,000 respondents recruited through Telegram—Uzbekistan’s most widely used digital platform—I tested whether participation in a simulated PB process affects judgments of state legitimacy. While the experiment produced near-zero treatment effects, it revealed strong citizen support for PB as an institution. The null findings suggest that enthusiasm may be concentrated at the initial stages of reform but diminishes as PB becomes routinized.

To interpret these findings, I conducted more than fifty semi-structured interviews with citizens, mahalla (neighborhood) leaders, and local officials. Respondents described PB as a breakthrough when it was first introduced, praising its ability to make the state more visible through concrete projects such as roads or playgrounds. Yet many emphasized that basic services like schools and hospitals should not depend on voting, and concerns about vote manipulation raised doubts about fairness. These perspectives explain why PB initially increased judgments of legitimacy but later failed to sustain them.

Beyond my dissertation, I contribute to the Local Economic and Administrative Performance (LEAP) research group. One coauthored paper, currently under revise-and-resubmit at the Policy Studies Journal, documents PB in Uzbekistan as a case of policy entrepreneurship in authoritarian governance. Another project investigates how the origin of foreign investors shapes bureaucratic preferences when weighing economic development against environmental sustainability, using original survey experimental data from Uzbek public servants. This work links my research agenda to broader debates on natural resource governance and environmental political economy.

Future Directions
 
My future research builds on these foundations to explore how participatory institutions interact with the governance of natural resources, infrastructure, and development. Comparative extensions will investigate how authoritarian regimes across regions adopt similar mechanisms to manage citizen engagement while preserving regime control. I also plan to develop a cross-national project on how environmental governance and participatory institutions intersect, particularly in nondemocratic settings where citizens demand public goods but regimes seek to retain centralized authority.
 
In addition, I maintain an active project on the diffusion of democratic norms through migration. Leveraging the U.S. green card lottery as a natural experiment, I examine how Uzbek migrants’ experiences influence political attitudes at home. This work contributes to broader conversations about globalization, migration, and political economy by showing how mobility can reshape political preferences in authoritarian contexts.